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SUPERFUND REAUTHORIZATION: IMPACT
ON STATE ENVIRONMENTAL
ENFORCEMENTt
GORDON . JOHNSON*
N addition to my involvement with New York State environmental
enforcement and policy, I have been involved with various other
states through my participation in the National Association of Attor-
neys General (NAAG). Over the past couple of months we have been
looking at the CERCLA Reauthorization Bill.' While I am going to
talk generally about the states' view on the Reauthorization process
and various issues that have been raised by it, I do want to give the
usual disclaimer (that most government people like to give), which is
that what I say here today will not necessarily reflect the views of my
state or any other state.
I have been asked to talk about regional issues, and in organizing
my presentation, I have classified the various state views into three
categories: (1) CERCLA as a paradigm; (2) state input and imple-
mentation of state law and standards, and (3) federal provision of
resources. The last category refers to money, which is obviously very
important to the states. Finally, I plan to touch briefly on natural re-
source damages, which is an important and crucial part of CERCLA
that needs protection and encouragement in any new legislation.
While it is not explicitly addressed by Senate Bill 1834, I believe some
comments may be helpful.
The first category is "CERCLA as a paradigm." CERCLA serves
as an example of how the law may address hazardous substance
problems. The most important element in CERCLA has been the im-
position of strict, joint and several liability 2 And while many industry
people and others feel that this was an extreme and unusual approach,
CERCLA, in fact, implemented venerable common law principles,
particularly the concept of strict liability for older hazardous activities.
It did so on a nationwide basis.
As a result of CERCLA, we have avoided the need to litigate the
common law standard of nuisance and strict, joint and several liability
on a case by case basis.
t This speech was presented at the Fordham Symposium, Superfund
Reauthonzation: Agenda for the 90's, held at Fordham Umversity School of Law on
March 11, 1994.
* Deputy Bureau Chief of Environmental Protection, Bureau of New York State
Attorney General's Office. B.A., Oberlin College; J.D., New York University School
of Law, cum laude.
1. Superfund Reform Act of 1994, S. 1834, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1994).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(32), 9607(a) (1988).
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Even before CERCLA was passed, New Jersey and New York
courts both imposed strict, joint and several liability pursuant to nui-
sance law and various types of state standards.3 And quite often, as
seen m New York, New Jersey and other states, CERCLA provided a
model for state statutes to treat those non-National Priorities List
(non-NPL) sites. This model has been used m New York and New
Jersey and other states, and its use has led to numerous types of clean-
ups.
I think it would be fair to say that most states do not want to elimi-
nate strict, joint and several liability, and that it is crucial that any
revision of the statute maintains these elements of liability. NAAG in
fact, has already adopted a resolution to that effect. The resolution,
which was adopted by the fifty states plus various other entities in
NAAG, maintains strict, joint and several liability m the Superfund
process.
Another thing to consider when we talk about changing CERCLA
is whether changes in the statute will result in learning curve
problems. Most commentators are in agreement that the statute did
not work well for the first five - maybe even eight - years after it
was passed. Part of the reason for the lag was a result of the time it
took to ascertain what the statute meant, coupled with the time it took
to communicate that meaning to the regulated community.
I know from my own personal experience that when the require-
ments of CERCLA were explained to Potentially Responsible Parties
(PRPs) and their lawyers back in the early 1980s, they looked at us
like we were crazy While we may have been crazy, we were still seri-
ous, and by imposing extensive liability through CERCLA, we elimi-
nated all defenses. Defense lawyers, in particular, could not
understand that concept. Well, they understand it now. And in fact, I
think there is every reason to believe that not only is the statute work-
ing substantially better now than it did in the past, I think it is fair to
say that it is working very well.
In New York, sixty-five to seventy percent of all clean-ups are being
funded by the PRPs and are being conducted without litigation.
Meetings with the Department of Environmental Conservation have
led to entry of orders on consent, because the regulated community,
e.g., the PRPs know what their liabilities are. The statute is now clear
and has been very effective in cleaning up those sites.
Nevertheless, there is a need to reduce transaction costs, and I think
that all states would welcome particular measures implemented by
any newly-reauthorized CERCLA that would reduce transaction
costs. The consensus in most states is that if the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) had really been diligent in its efforts to reduce
3. See, e.g., State v. Schenectady Chems., Inc., 479 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (App. Div.
1984); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1050-52 (2d Cir. 1985).
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transaction costs, there already existed adequate authority to do so
within the statute as presently written. For example, there are provi-
sions in the statute for expedited de minimis settlements and for
NBARS on the allocation of liability.4 EPA rarely used these provi-
sions and, as a result, de minimis parties in particular have been en-
gaged in long drawn-out processes. New York, for example, has had
its disputes with EPA Region II over when to do settlements and what
the scope of them should be. Thus, changes in the statute which
would allow settlements and allocations to be performed more quickly
and easily would be welcomed.
But again, the idea that there are too many transaction costs and
that they are too high is quite overstated. First, a recent Rand study
that was completed this fall showed that thirty-five to forty percent of
the transaction costs in all Superfund litigation relate to insurance
coverage.5 In other words, the transaction costs do not relate to the
clean-up program itself, but rather to the battles between companies
and their insurance carriers.
In evaluating whether Superfund works, however, I do not believe
that costs incurred through insurance disputes should be indicative of
anything. These considerations raise insurance law issues and not en-
vironmental issues.
Furthermore, while the initial transaction costs in most Superfund
cases are relatively high, in the long run, once the parties come to-
gether to enter into a settlement and begin the clean-up process, the
costs, as a total percentage of clean-up costs, are substantially re-
duced. The Rand study found that once the remedy has begun, the
expectation is that transaction costs relating to legal costs (in particu-
lar at Superfund sites), are going to drop to a level that is consistent or
even below the typical costs in traditional tort litigation.6
In sum, while there are clearly steps that could be taken to reduce
transaction costs, I do not believe that the problem is nearly as severe
as it is claimed to be.
Senate Bill 1834, which is the one major proposal that we have
before us, has succeeded m large part in maintaining joint and several
liability. When the states consider the Bill, they will generally support
those aspects which involve the retention of joint and several liability.7
Currently, a party can avoid joint and several liability by settling
through the allocation process.8 Simply put, when settlements occur,
parties avoid joint and several liability by paying their part. The Bill
does not substantially change that concept.
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9622(g), 9622(e)(3) (1988) (nonbmding allocations of responsibil-
ity and de minimms settlements).
5. EPA Should Heed Own Study, Bus. INs., Nov. 15, 1993, at 8.
6. Id.
7. S. 1834 § 404.
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9622(f)-(g), 9613(0(2) (1988).
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Other proposals for the Reauthorization that have been put before
Congress by various interest groups failed the strict, joint and several
test, wich states feel is essential to CERCLA. One proposal which
has been strongly opposed by most states is the public works proposal
which shifts all of the costs to the public with no liability for events
that occurred before 1986.
Senate Bill 1834 sets forth a variation of the so-called mandatory
fair share proposals, but it eliminates the mandatory aspect of the fair
share.9 The proposals which often require a fair share allocation and
eliminate joint and several liability have been and will continue to be
opposed by the states.
In concluding my discussion of this category, I emphasize the suc-
cesses of CERCLA that are not so apparent m the mythology but are
part of the actual history of Superfund. First of all, there have been
monumental changes in industrial processes, a drastic reduction m the
production of hazardous waste, and a significant elimination of imper-
manent disposal methodologies to get nd of that waste. That is proba-
bly the most important success of CERCLA, m that it has changed the
way in which business has actually operated and in how industrial
processes have been looked at during evaluations. Companies now
realize that they are going to be liable forever (unless they change the
law, of course) for their wastes. As a result, they are producing less
and dealing with it in a much more responsible way. This is something
that we must continue to encourage and I believe that any change in
CERCLA that eliminates or diminishes that strong incentive to stop
generating waste and to deal with it properly will be strongly opposed
by the states. Remember, we are stuck with the garbage when we are
done producing it.
Now to the second major success of CERCLA. Despite all the criti-
cisms of the way it has been implemented, it has the potential for re-
dressing years of environmental injustice. Environmental hazards
were traditionally sited disproportionately in low income minority
neighborhoods - neighborhoods composed of people of color. While
it is true that CERCLA did not always address clean-ups fairly, the
point is that CERCLA has the power to correct environmental injus-
tices and any proposal that changes or threatens this ability should be
defeated.
Unfortunately, Senate Bill 1834 contains significant problems with
respect to environmental justice. While it establishes procedures for
better community input, it eliminates a series of CERCLA require-
ments which fundamentally address environmental justice.1°
Primarily, under the Bill there is no community veto on the choice
of remedy selection. Thus, while the community's views will be heard,
9. S. 1834, Title IV, Liability and Allocation.
10. Id. §§ 101-05.
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it is the government that will decide the clean-up remedy. The signifi-
cance of the Bill's elimination of the community veto is that local deci-
sions on land use can be ovemdden by the federal government in
choosing remedies at sites. This can have serious consequences.
Finally, and perhaps most important from an environmental justice
point of view, the Bill eliminates the preference for permanent reme-
dies in favor of remedies that employ treatment." As a result, con-
tainment remedies will be more likely in all neighborhoods, which
could potentially lead to exposure of neighborhood residents when
remedies fail or are not properly implemented.
When Vermce Miller spoke earlier, she noted that it was signifi-
cantly less likely that minority commuities would witness the imple-
mentation of permanent remedies.' 2 Is it fairer or preferable to say
that should the Bill pass, there will be no permanent remedies any-
where? I am not sure that that is environmental justice and a fair way
to proceed.
The second category of state views has to do with "state input and
implementation of state law." A basic premise of environmental law
for years has been that federal environmental statutes do not pre-
empt state law. In other words, they set the floor, not the ceiling. At
the risk of sounding like Ross Barnett or George Wallace, I am a firm
believer in state rights, at least when it comes to environmental law.
Senate Bill 1834 essentially pre-empts state laws in numerous areas,' 3
and consequently creates very serious problems.
Let us focus on one area, that of clean-up standards. Under the
current law there are "applicable, relevant and appropriate standards"
(ARAs)' 4 that have to be met. There are no ARAs in the Senate Bill.
Furthermore, under this proposal there are not even mandatory fed-
eral standards. Under the proposed Bill, President Clinton, who will
be acting as EPA in this case, will choose what is the appropriate fed-
eral standard to apply at a facility.' 5 While Senate Bill 1834 does give
lip service to applying more stringent state standards,16 the only state
standard that has to be applied is one which is "specifically addressing
remedial action that is adopted for the purpose of protecting human
health or the environment with the best available scientific evidence
through a public process .... 17 I counted eight issues in that sen-
tence, and I believe there will be enormous litigation over defining
state standards according to this passage.
11. Id. §§ 501-07.
12. Vermce D. Miller, Toward a Reasonable Allocation Scheme: A Public Interest
Perspective on Superfund Reauthorization, 5 FORDHAM ENvwL. L.J. 317, 319 (1994).
13. S. 1834 §§ 201-07.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d) (1988).
15. S. 1834 § 201(a)(j).
16. Id. § 201(a)(g).
17. Id. § 502(d)(5)(A)(ii).
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Another problem with the Bill is that CERCLA section 121(f)(1) of
the current statute,'18 which provides for meamngful state input on de-
cision making, has been eliminated. In its place there is a delegation
and referral process, which is something which the states have wanted.
However, the Bill has elimnated mandatory consultation with the
states.
Again, to give an example, under the current statute, before EPA
can take a site off the NPL, it must obtain state concurrence. 19 Under
the new Bill, it does not. The process would be turned into an admin-
istrative procedure that is not subject to rule-making in terms of de-
listing sites. All that would be required is some public notice.
The third category I want to discuss is resources - money. I find it
absolutely perplexing to try to figure out how costs will be allocated
under the proposed Bill. In comparing the amendments with the cur-
rent statute, the Bill makes absolutely no sense in this aspect.
One important issue that remains unresolved by the proposal is the
treatment of operation and maintenance costs. Currently, states pay
one hundred percent of operation and maintenance costs. I think the
Bill was meant to change that, but it is unclear. States would certainly
welcome a change in which there is cost sharing for operation and
maintenance expenses.
Finally, a word on natural resource damages.2" The Bill does not
address natural resource damages, which have become a very impor-
tant issue among the states. We have essentially five proposals that
we believe the Bill should include.
First, we believe that CERCLA should require that natural re-
source damage assessment decisions made by the states or by federal
trustees are reviewed on the admimstrative record.
Second, we would like the statute of limitations on natural resource
damages in CERCLA2' to contain the same requirements as the Oil
Pollution Act,22 so that there is consistency between the two statutes
of limitations.
Third, the Bill provides that enforcement costs and oversight costs
for the federal government are to be considered response costs.23 We
believe that enforcement and oversight costs should be considered re-
sponse costs for the states, and that natural resource damage assess-
ments and recovery costs should be considered response costs as well.
Fourth, it would be helpful if the Bill made clear that natural re-
source damage recoveries could be spent on a regional basis. This
would allow, for example, a recovery for an oil spill on the south shore
18. 42 U.S.C. § 9621(f) (1988).
19. Id.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g) (1988).
21. Id.
22. 33 U.S.C. § 2717 (1990).
23. S. 1834 §§ 404(f)(4), 409(i)(5).
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of Staten Island to be spent to acquire wetlands on the eastern shore
of Staten Island.
Finally, although Superfund currently allows the use of Fund mon-
eys to conduct natural resource damage assessments,24 it is m direct
conflict with the Internal Revenue Code, which governs the actual ex-
penditures from the Fund.' That should be changed, so that natural
resource damages can be paid for by the Fund.
24. 42 U.s.c. § 9611(b) (1988).
25. 26 U.S.C. § 9507(c)(1)(A) (1988).
19941

